We analyze the effects of electricity market mergers in an environment where firms endogenously choose their level of forward contracts prior to competing in the wholesale market. We apply our model to Alberta's wholesale electricity market. Firms have an incentive to reduce their forward contract coverage in the more concentrated post-merger equilibrium. We demonstrate that endogenous forward contracting magnifies the price increasing impacts of mergers, resulting in larger reductions in consumer surplus. Current market screening procedures used to analyze electricity mergers consider firms' preexisting forward commitments. We illustrate that ignoring the endogenous nature of firms' forward commitments can yield biased conclusions regarding the impacts of market structure changes such as mergers. In particular, we show that the price effects of mergers can be largely underestimated when forward contract quantities are held at pre-merger levels. Whether the profits of the merged firm are greater with fixed or endogenous forward quantities is ambiguous.
Introduction
Worldwide, the electricity industry has been undergoing considerable consolidation through large-scale mergers and acquisitions. 1 In the United States, recent examples of high profile electricity market merger cases include Exelon and Constellation (MPSC, 2012) and Exelon and Public Service Enterprise Group (PSEG) (FERC, 2005) valued at $8 and $16 billion, respectively. Analyses of mergers and market structure changes in the electricity industry present distinct challenges for regulatory authorities. While there is strong potential for market power, conventional market concentration measures used to assess market power are poorly suited for electricity markets (Borenstein et al., 1999; Bushnell, 2005 Bushnell, , 2007 .
A prominent issue that has arisen in merger and market power analyses in electricity markets is the effect of firms' fixed-price forward commitments on firm behavior. Forward contracts result in a firm committing to supply output at a fixed price in advance of the spot market. Such contracts can reflect retail commitments for vertically integrated utilities (Bushnell et al., 2008) , competitive arrangements between generators and distribution utilities or retailers (Crew and Kleindorfer, 2002; Loxley and Salant, 2004) , or regulatory requirements imposed on dominant generators (Frutos and Fabra, 2012) .
It is well-established that the incentives of firms to exercise market power in wholesale spot markets depend critically on the quantity of electricity that firms have contracted in advance at fixed prices (Wolak, 2000 (Wolak, , 2007 Bushnell et al., 2008) . A firm that withholds a unit of output in order to exercise market power and raise the spot market price will realize increased revenues only on the portion of its output that will earn the spot market price, and is not previously committed under fixed prices. For this reason, the level of forward contracting has been a central issue in several recent electricity merger cases.
For example, in the Exelon and Constellation merger analysis, the assumed level of forward contracts in the post-merger equilibrium had large implications on the predicted wholesale market impacts of the merger (MPSC, 2011 (MPSC, , 2012 . Experts raised concerns that the merged firm will have an incentive to reduce its forward contracts post-merger, elevating concerns over market power execution (see MPSC, 2012, pg. 47) . 2 Recent changes to the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) horizontal market power screens that include pivotal supplier tests have been viewed as improvements to the use of concentration measures in part because they account for firms' existing forward commitments (Bushnell, 2005; FERC, 2012 FERC, , 2015 . 3 However, the use of pre-existing forward commitments abstracts from changes in firms' incentives to sign new forward contracts in the presence of a merger.
In response to these concerns, this paper develops a model to analyze the effect of mergers on firms' incentives to forward contract. Further, we investigate the impact of endogenous forward contracting on post-merger wholesale market outcomes. Our model is an extension of the broad literature that investigates endogenous forward contracting in oligopoly markets. In particular, we build on the seminal contribution of Allaz and Vila (1993) , which investigates the impact of endogenous forward contracting 1 For example, in 2012 in the United States, 107 Gigawatts (GW) of generation capacity was exchanged via mergers and acquisitions, representing 10% of aggregate capacity nationwide (EIA, 2013) . See Moss (2008) and Federico (2011) for a survey of recent electricity market merger cases in United States and Europe, respectively. 2 Similarly, in the proposed merger of Exelon and PSEG (FERC, 2005) , the importance of forward contracts in the postmerger environment was emphasized in several equilibrium simulation studies (Morris and Oska, 2008; McRae and Wolak, 2009 ). The estimated merger price effects depended critically on the merged firm's post-merger forward commitments. 3 A supplier passes the pivotal supplier test if its uncommitted capacity is less than the difference between the annual peak wholesale demand and uncommitted installed capacity of all other suppliers. A firm's uncommitted capacity reflects its installed nameplate generation capacity, net of its native load obligations and long-term supply commitments (FERC, 2015) . on competition in oligopolistic markets when firms are risk-neutral, compete via Cournot, and forward contract for strategic reasons. In this model, firms unilaterally forward contract to pre-commit to a larger wholesale market output, inducing their rivals to reduce their output. The authors find that forward contracting increases competition because all firms attempt to exploit the pre-commitment effect. 4 Other studies have looked at how forward contracting is affected by market structure. Bushnell (2007) investigates the relationship between market structure and the degree of forward contracting using a two-stage model with strategic forward contracting and Cournot spot market competition. Firms are risk-neutral and have symmetric linear marginal cost functions. The author shows that the proportion of market quantity that is forward contracted increases in the number of firms, and that forward contracts magnify the effect of concentration. 5 Miller (2013) extends this analysis by considering the welfare effects of mergers when firms have symmetric constant marginal costs. The author finds that the welfare losses from mergers are mitigated by exogenous forward contracting, but that when the market is highly concentrated, welfare losses can be increased in the presence of endogenous forward contracting.
While the insights of these papers regarding the relationship between forward markets and market power are important, their lessons for merger analysis are incomplete. Results that are based on changing the number of symmetric firms with linear and increasing marginal cost curves do not capture the possibility that a merger simultaneously reduces the number of firms and creates a new firm with a different (lower) marginal cost curve. Likewise, a limitation of analysis of a Cournot model that assumes constant average costs is that it is subject to what is sometimes referred to as the "merger paradox" -mergers other than near mergers to monopoly tend not to be profitable (see Salant et al, 1983) . Perry and Porter (1985) argue that in such a model, mergers do not make sense conceptually because firms bring no assets into the merger. The authors develop a framework in which a firm's marginal cost depends on its capital stock; merging firms combine their capital stock, reducing marginal costs. This framework is adapted by McAfee and Williams (1992) to analyze the welfare effects of horizontal mergers. 6 In this article, we combine these various areas of the literature to investigate how mergers affect firms' incentives to forward contract and illustrate the impact this has on wholesale market competition. In particular, we use the two-stage forward contracting and Cournot competition model of Allaz and Vila (1993) and Bushnell (2007) , in which risk-neutral firms compete via Cournot competition and forward contract for strategic reasons, and adopt the capital stock interpretation of marginal cost established by Perry and Porter (1985) . By considering an asymmetric environment where firms' cost depend on their level of capital stock, we avoid the "merger paradox". This allows us investigate the relationship between endogenous forward contracts and the estimated effects of mergers. Using this model as a foundation, we illustrate our results empirically using data from Alberta's wholesale electricity market for 2013.
We find that firms reduce the proportion of their wholesale market output that is covered by forward 4 The competition-enhancing role of forward markets has been found to be sensitive to certain assumptions in the model. Hughes and Kao (1997) emphasize the importance of public knowledge of forward contracts. Mahenc and Salanie (2004) demonstrate that under price competition forward markets may allow firms to soften competition, while Liski and Montero (2006) and Green and Le Coq (2006) illustrate that forward contracts can facilitate collusion in a infinitely repeated context. de Braganca and Daglish (2016) demonstrate that firms may potentially exercise market power in the spot market to increase subsequent forward market prices. 5 Newbery (2009) extends Bushnell's analysis to consider firms with asymmetric constant marginal cost and develops a residual supplier index to assess market power in electricity markets. 6 A discussion of Cournot models employing such cost functions and their usefulness in merger simulation can be found in Werden and Froeb (2008) . A recent example employing this framework in a merger simulation is Greenfield et al. (2015) .
contracts in the post-merger equilibrium. This is driven primarily by a reduction in the strategic effect of forward contracting. That is, a firm's rivals reduce their wholesale market output by less due to an increase in its forward contracted output in the more concentrated post-merger equilibrium. We show that endogenous forward contracting elevates the price effects of a merger because of firms' incentives to reduce their forward contracted quantities compared to a setting where forward contract quantities are held constant at pre-merger levels. As well, we find that while endogenous forward contracting by all firms yields larger merger price effects, the merging firms' profits may be larger in the post-merger equilibrium if all firms' forward contract quantities are held constant at pre-merger levels. Holding forward contract quantities fixed at pre-merger levels commits the merged firm to a larger level of wholesale output, forcing rivals to reduce their wholesale production. This implies that endogenous forward contracting has the potential to erode the merging firms' profits.
Our results suggest that the price effects of mergers are dampened in regions where firms' forward contracts are held constant post-merger due to regulatory requirements or mandated supply contracts. 7
Further, our results demonstrate that merger analyses that take firms' forward positions (either in MWs or as a percentage of output) as given can understate the wholesale market price effects of mergers in electricity markets. This can lead to biased conclusions regarding the impacts of mergers on market competition. These results provide support for the claims of expert testimony in recent electricity market mergers cases which raise concerns over firms' incentives to alter their forward contracts post-merger (e.g., MPSC, 2011 MPSC, , 2012 . Further, these results raise concerns over the use of pre-existing forward commitments in FERC's market power screening tests to analyze the price effects of proposed mergers.
We develop and explain these results as follows. Section 2 reviews the key elements of our model, characterizes the equilibrium outcome of our two-stage forward contracting model, and investigates the effects of a merger on forward contracting in the general asymmetric environment. Section 3 considers the symmetric oligopoly equilibrium and illustrates the effects of a merger on forward contracting incentives and wholesale market outcomes when symmetric firms merge. Section 4 uses an empirical model in the context of Alberta's electricity market to illustrate the impacts of endogenous forward contracting in the presence of a merger with asymmetric firms. Section 5 concludes and discusses directions for further research. The Appendix provides the proofs of all formal conclusions.
Model
In our model, N ≥ 3 firms compete to supply a homogeneous product (electricity). In the first stage of the model, firms simultaneously choose the quantities q f i to sell in the forward market at a price P f . In the second stage, given the quantities of all firms in the forward market, firms choose their spot market quantities q i simultaneously. 8 Market demand in the spot market is linear and is modeled as
i /2k i , where k i represents firm i's capital stock for each i = 1, 2, .., N.
Following Allaz and Vila (1993) and Bushnell (2007) , we assume that all participants are risk-neutral 7 Exogenous long-run forward commitments can reflect regulatory mandated fixed-price contracts or requirements linked with the divestment of generation assets from large incumbent suppliers (Bushnell, 2007; Frutos and Fabra, 2012) . 8 Bushnell et al. (2008) illustrate that Cournot Nash equilibria approximate observed behavior well in electricity markets once firms' forward commitments are taken into account.
and firms' forward positions are public knowledge. 9 Further, we assume that forward and spot market prices are efficiently arbitraged, so that forward prices equal expected spot market prices. Our solution concept is Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium, and we solve the model using backward induction.
Second Stage: Spot Market
Consider the second stage spot market where firm i's forward quantity q f i has already been committed at price P f . The second stage spot market profit function for firm i is given by:
Firm i sells q i − q f i units of output at the spot market price; if this term is positive (negative), firm i is a net seller (buyer) of electricity in the wholesale market. The remaining output q f i receives the price P f , which is taken as given in the second stage. As a result, the firm has less incentive to withhold output to exercise market power when q f i is large, since the benefit of increasing the spot market price is only realized on output sold in the spot market and not subject to a fixed forward price.
For a given level of forward contracting, assuming an interior solution, firm i's payoff maximizing production level is defined by: 10
From condition (2), marginal revenue converges to the wholesale market price (P (Q)) as a firm's forward contracted quantity (q f i ) converges to its spot market output (q i ), so that firm i's behavior converges to that of a perfectly competitive producer.
Lemma 1 summarizes the equilibrium spot market aggregate output, market-clearing price, and each firm's optimal quantity for a given level of forward contracting.
Lemma 1. For a given level of forward contracting, the optimal solution in the spot market entails:
where
Lemma 2 summarizes the impact of a change in a firm's forward commitment on spot market outcomes.
9 For example, the relative transparency of forward contracts in electricity markets can arise because of regulatory oversight (Bushnell, 2007) . 10 Throughout the theoretical analysis we focus on interior solutions. In equilibrium, the interior solutions are verified. In the empirical analysis in Section 4, we have verified that the addition of non-negative forward contracting and spot market output constraints does not impact the key results of the analysis.
Lemma 2. An increase in firm i's forward contracted quantity: (i) increases firm i's spot market quantity (q i ), (ii) decreases firm j's spot market quantity (q j ) for all i = j, (iii) increases total output Q, and (iv) decreases the spot price P (Q).
The results in Lemma 2 parallels the findings in the previous literature that forward contracts are pro-competitive in the spot market (e.g., Allaz and Vila, 1993; Bushnell, 2007 ). An increase in firm i's forward commitment results in an increase in firm i's output and a decrease in its opponents' output q j for all j = i. By forward contracting, firm i is making a credible commitment to increase its spot market quantity and so, other firms reduce their spot market output. An increase in a firm's forward commitment level results in a net increase in total output and a reduction in the spot-market price because all firms have an incentive to exploit the pre-commitment effect of forward contracting.
First Stage: Forward Contracts
In this section, we analyze firms' incentives to forward contract. In the first stage, firms simultaneously choose quantities to sell under forward contracts, assuming that the subsequent spot market will follow the second stage Nash Equilibria derived in the previous section. Similar to Allaz and Vila (1993) , we assume that there are no arbitrage opportunities, so that the forward price equals the spot price.
) be firm i's second stage Nash Equilibrium spot market quantity given the forward positions of all firms from the first stage, where q Lemma 3. A firm i's optimal forward contracting quantity q f i , as a function of every other firm's forward contracting quantity q f −i , solves:
where firm i's equilibrium spot market output q i (q
Condition (10) reflects the balance between firm i's offsetting strategic and direct incentives to forward contract. Conditions (3) - (5) and (10) characterize the equilibrium of this two-stage forward contracting and spot market competition model. 11 In equilibrium, the proportion of output that is forward contracted for firm i is represented by:
Several comparative statics results immediately follow from (11). First, in our model firm i's forward contract coverage (
) depends only on the sum of the β j terms for all j = i, where β j = bk j bk j +1 depends only on b and k j . It follows that a firm's forward contracting ratio is independent of its own capital stock. k i enters firm i's strategic and direct effect terms symmetrically, with the result that k i cancels out in the ratio. Second, a firm's forward contracting ratio is increasing in the sum of the rival β j terms. As a result, it follows that a firm's forward contracting ratio is increasing in the demand slope parameter b and the capacity of any rival j (k j ). Third, the addition of a new rival firm will cause an increase in the sum of the rival β j terms, and therefore an increase in a firm's forward contracting ratio.
To understand the intuition of these results, the expression in (11) is the ratio of the strategic effect (the effect of firm i's forward contract quantity on its rivals' spot quantities) over the direct effect (the effect of firm i's forward quantity on its own spot quantity). An increase in rival firm j's capital stock (k j ), which reduces the slope of its marginal cost curve, increases the sensitivity of firm j's spot market quantity to firm i's forward quantity by rotating j's second stage spot market best response function.
This increased strategic effect exceeds the effect of an increase of firm j's capital stock on firm i's direct effect, implying that as k j increases, firm i has a greater incentive to use forward contracting strategically.
Alternatively, a reduction in the number of firms reduces the strategic effect of forward contracting.
The impact of reducing N on the strategic effect dominates the impact on the direct effect, resulting in an overall decrease in firms' forward contracted ratio. Our findings bring together prior results in the literature. In particular, our findings regarding the impacts of changes in the capital stock (k) are consistent with Breitmoser (2013) , who shows in an Allaz-Vila duopoly model with linear marginal cost that increasing the slopes of the firms' marginal cost curves reduces competition by weakening the degree of strategic substitution between firms' quantities. Likewise, the effect of changes in N in our model follows the findings in Bushnell's (2007) symmetric oligopoly model that firms' forward contract coverage is increasing in N .
Using the intuition established by equation (11), Proposition 1 demonstrates the effect of a merger on firms' forward contracting ratios, assuming that all firms adjust their forward contract quantities 11 A firm's profit function is strictly concave in its own strategy. This ensures that there exists a unique equilibrium level of forward contracts and spot market production for each firm. See the Proofs of Lemmas 1 and 3 for a formal derivation.
endogenously in the post-merger equilibrium. 12 Proposition 1. After the merger, all firms reduce the proportion of output sold forward.
A merger represents a simultaneous reduction in the number of firms and an increase in the merging firm's capital stock. From the comparative statics discussed above, these effects have counteracting impacts on a firm's forward contracted ratio. Proposition 1 illustrates that while the increase in the merging firm's capital stock places upward pressure on the non-merging firms' forward contract coverage, the reduced strategic incentive to forward contract as the number of firms increases dominates this effect, resulting in a reduction in the non-merging firms' forward contracting ratio. For the merging firm, the higher market concentration reduces its strategic incentive for forward contracting. The reduction in the strategic forward contracting incentive decreases the merged firm's forward contracted ratio.
A reduction in the proportion of output sold forward has the potential to elevate the price effects of mergers because forward contracts are pro-competitive in our modeling framework. In particular, the price effects of a merger may be magnified in the presence of endogenous forward contracting compared to an environment where firms' forward commitments are fixed pre-and post-merger. Due to the complexity of the analysis, we rely on empirical methods to illustrate these results in the asymmetric environment.
Mergers in a Symmetric Oligopoly
In this section, we provide analytical solutions for the symmetric oligopoly equilibrium and consider the impacts of a merger, accounting for the endogenous nature of forward contracts. Assume initially that the industry is a symmetric oligopoly with k 1 = k 2 = ... = k N = k. Lemma 4 provides the equilibrium spot market price and forward and spot market quantities.
Lemma 4. In a symmetric market, the following conditions characterize the equilibrium of our forward contracting and spot market competition model:
, and
For this symmetric equilibrium, the ratio of output that is forward contracted is represented by:
12 In addition to the setting where all firms endogenously choose forward contracts, Allaz and Vila (1993) consider the setting where a single firm endogenously chooses its forward position. While we focus on the setting where all firms endogenously choose their forward positions in the pre-and post-merger equilibrium, the reduced strategic incentive for forward contracting due to a merger identified in Proposition 1 is likely to hold in the setting where a single firm forward contracts for strategic reasons. As noted in Section 5, a detailed analysis of this case is left for future research.
Forward contract coverage increases with the number of firms and the level of capital stock (k). 13
Next, we consider the impacts of a merger where all firms endogenously choose their forward contracted quantities in the post-merger equilibrium. The subscripts M and N M denote the merged and non-merged firms, respectively. The capital stock of the merged firm becomes k M = 2k, so that the merged firm's marginal cost becomes
. Using the solutions from the general asymmetric model in (5) and (10), we can derive the post-merger spot market and forward market quantities for the merged firm (q M , q f M ) and for each non-merging firm (q N M , q f N M ). In the post-merger equilibrium, the percentage of spot market output that is forward contracted for the merged and non-merged firm is represented by:
. From Proposition 1 we know that in the post-merger equilibrium, all firms reduce the proportion of output sold forward. As discussed in detail in the asymmetric environment, the reduced forward contracting coverage is driven by the reduction in the strategic effect in the more concentrated market.
This dominates the impact of increasing the merged firms' capital stock parameter which elevates all nonmerging firms' strategic incentive to forward contract. For the symmetric model, Proposition 2 describes the effects of the merger on spot market outcomes and consumer surplus.
Proposition 2. In the post-merger equilibrium, aggregate output decreases, spot market price increases, and consumer surplus decreases. In addition, these merger effects are magnified in the presence of endogenous forward contracting compared to a setting where forward contract quantities are held fixed at pre-merger levels.
From Proposition 2, in the symmetric model if we held forward commitments (in MWs) constant at pre-merger levels, the price effects of mergers would be dampened relative to the case of endogenous contracting. This occurs because in the endogenous environment the reduced strategic incentive of forward contracting results in a lower forward contract coverage for all firms. This magnifies the reduction in wholesale market output in the more concentrated post-merger equilibrium. Proposition 2 illustrates that it is essential to consider the nature of firms' forward commitments when analyzing the impact of mergers and market structure changes. Further, these results imply that if a merger occurs in a region with exogenous forward contracts (e.g., due to regulatory restrictions or long-term supply commitments), the price increasing impacts of the merger will be lower than one in which forward contracts are endogenous.
Proposition 3 considers the merged firm's profits in the setting where all firms' forward contracted quantities are chosen endogenously compared to a setting where all firms' forward commitments are held at pre-merger levels.
Proposition 3. The merged firm's profits are strictly higher when forward contract quantities are fixed at pre-merger levels than with endogenous forward contracting if N is sufficiently sufficiently large, holding parameters bk constant.
Proposition 3 demonstrates that the impact of endogenous forward contracting on the merging firm's profit is ambiguous. Because the merger reduces the merged firm's forward contract position, holding the firms to forward contracted quantities at pre-merger levels commits the merged firm to a higher level of spot market output than would result under endogenous forward contracts. However, doing so dampens the price effects of the merger (e.g., see Proposition 2). Recall that a higher level of forward contracting by the merged firm has a strategic effect of reducing its rivals output in the spot market, holding all else constant. The magnitude of this strategic effect is increasing in the number of firms in the industry, relative to the price effect of endogenizing forward positions, which falls as N increases. Therefore, for a sufficiently large N , the strategic benefit of holding forward contracted quantities fixed at pre-merger levels (in MWs) results in a higher profit for the merged firm compared to a setting where forward contracts are endogenous. While endogenous forward contracting elevates the impact of the merger on spot market prices, it has the potential to erode the merged firm's profits. Figure 1 demonstrates the region in which the merged firms' profits are higher holding forward contracted quantities at pre-merger levels compared to endogenous forward contracts, for any given level on the parameters bk. The strategic effect of forward contracting is increasing in b k. Therefore, the critical value on N where the merged firm's profits are higher when forward quantities are held at pre-merger levels identified in Proposition 3 is decreasing in b k.
Empirical Analysis
In this section, we utilize a detailed data set from Alberta's wholesale electricity market to provide an additional example illustrating the potential role of endogenous forward contracting on the effects of mergers. Using data from 2013, we simulate the effects of hypothetical mergers among the five largest firms ATCO, Capital Power (CP), ENMAX, TransAlta (TA), and TransCanada (TC), assuming that firms compete according to the Cournot model with endogenous forward contracting described above.
We compare these merger effects to those predicted under alternative assumptions regarding forward contract positions. We adjust the theoretical model to account for several realities facing electricity markets: capacity constraints, inflexible generation, nonlinear marginal cost, and heterogeneity in firms' generation portfolios. We solve the model using numerical methods because of the complexity introduced by considering these market characteristics.
Our analysis proceeds in the following steps. First, we estimate a residual demand function to be served by the five incumbents, net of price-responsive imports and supply from a competitive fringe that consists of over twenty-five small firms. Second, we use data on asset-level capacities, along with coal and natural gas prices, to approximate smooth (fourth-order polynomial) marginal cost curves for the five largest firms. Third, we simulate the pre-merger Cournot Nash equilibrium with strategic forward contracting. Fourth, we use our model to simulate the impacts of mergers in the presence of endogenous forward contracting and compare these results to a setting where forward contracts are held fixed in terms of a percentage of output or in MWs of forward quantities at pre-merger levels. Finally, we explore the robustness of the qualitative results to changes in the price-elasticity of the residual demand function.
Alberta's Electricity Market and Data
Alberta's wholesale electricity market has several features that make it a useful empirical setting in which to apply our theoretical model. 14 First, firms compete in a single hourly wholesale (spot) market to supply electricity; there is no locational pricing to reflect congestion. Second, the market is relatively concentrated with the five largest firms controlling 70% of dispatchable thermal generation capacity (MSA, 2013) , and there are limited regulatory mechanisms to restrict firms' abilities to exercise market power in the wholesale market. In particular, there are no bid (offer) mitigation mechanisms to limit firms' abilities to bid above (estimated) marginal cost. In addition, the province's Market Surveillance Administrator has stated in guidelines that the unilateral exercise of market power is permitted (MSA, 2011) . This feature makes Alberta a natural laboratory for analyzing incentives for market power. Third, firms sign fixed-priced forward contracts prior to wholesale market competition (MSA, 2010a) . Forward contracts may take the form of bilateral agreements, often between a generator and retailer, or as standardized products traded through the Natural Gas Exchange (NGX) and over the counter (OTC) brokers.
Our analysis makes use of publicly available data from the Alberta Electric System Operator (AESO) from January 1, 2013 to December 31, 2013. This data set includes hourly unit-level production and offers, import supply, transmission capacity limits, market-level demand, and the ownership and technological characteristics of generation assets. We use hourly natural gas and coal prices from Alberta's Natural Gas Exchange (NGX) and Wyoming's Powder River Basin to compute fuel input costs, respectively.
We obtained hourly weather data for British Columbia (BC) and Saskatchewan (SK) from Environment Canada. Our sample includes 8,760 hours. Table 1 presents summary statistics and market concentration measures in Alberta during our period of study. Generation capacity is concentrated within the five largest firms, with a competitive fringe that 14 For detailed reviews of Alberta's electricity market see Olmstead and Ayres (2014) and Brown and Olmstead (2016) .
contains over twenty-five smaller firms. 15 The remaining columns in Panel A provide information on the firm-specific average output, generation capacity utilization rate (as a percentage of available capacity), and market share in terms of output. With the exception of TransAlta, the large firms have a lower utilization rate than the competitive fringe, consistent with the exercise of market power by these firms.
In addition to flexible generation capacity, firms have inflexible must-run generation and minimum stable generation (MSG) that must be operating due to engineering constraints. Must-run generation represents wind and cogeneration facilities. Cogeneration produces both steam and electricity for industrial use on-site using natural gas. In Alberta, cogeneration is primarily associated with oil sands production. In 2013, there was 1,088 and 2,200 MWs of wind and cogeneration capacity, respectively. The proportion of a firm's capacity that is considered must-run or MSG varies widely across firm. While for Capital
Power and ENMAX, must-run and MSG account for roughly one-third of available capacity, at least half of available capacity is considered must-run or MSG for the remaining three large firms. This suggests that these three firms have less ability to exercise market power. Table 1 provides various summary statistics. The hourly market-clearing price has a high degree of price volatility with a maximum at the wholesale market price-cap of $999.99/MWh. Imports from neighboring provinces are limited as a portion of total market demand. Notes: Available capacity contains all production capacity (including wind) (MSA, 2013) . Capacity utilization is the average ratio of observed production and available capacity. The sample size T = 8, 760.
Panel B in
It has been established elsewhere that Alberta's wholesale electricity market exhibits a sizable degree of market power, primarily in hours with high market demand (Brown and Olmstead, 2016) . In Alberta, regulation prohibits physical withholding of available capacity. Market power is exercised through economic withholding: deliberately pricing capacity out of the market. To illustrate this bidding behaviour, Table 2 provides the 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles of each firm's bid markups over marginal cost (in $/MWh). 16 These markups are presented for all technologies and separately for natural gas units, which are in general the highest marginal cost units and those most likely to be withheld. Table 2 illustrates that three of the five largest firms often submit large positive bid markups on their natural gas units at levels suggestive of economic withholding. Less economic withholding is suggested by the markups of the fringe, or by the markups of TransAlta and TransCanada, neither of which have flexible (non-cogeneration) natural gas units. 17 The negative bid markups occur when looking across all generation technologies because firms systematically submit zero bids for a portion of their coal capacities to ensure these MWs are dispatched to satisfy engineering constraints. We account for these important non-convexities in the firms' marginal cost functions by incorporating minimum stable generation constraints into the model. 
Empirical Model and Estimation Method
We formulate a two-stage forward-spot market model of wholesale electricity market competition where N = 5 asymmetric firms compete to supply electricity over t = 1, 2, ..., T periods. We assume that electricity is a homogeneous product with a uniform price. In the first-stage, firms make their forward contracting decisions q f it and receive a forward price P f . In the second-stage, firms take forward contracts as given and choose their spot market quantities q it simultaneously. We formulate this multi-stage equilibrium model as an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints. Each firm's output can be divided into two categories. Each firm i has a certain level of must-run generation q M R it ≥ 0 that has zero marginal cost. In addition, each firm's flexible generation is given by q it . Define C it (q it ) to be firm i's cost of producing q it units of electricity. Each firm i's flexible spot market output is constrained above by its maximum capacity q M ax it and below by its inflexible minimum stable generation (MSG) q M SG it ≥ 0 that must be operating in order to satisfy engineering constraints. In period t, a firm i's total output Q it = q it + q M R it and market output Q t = N i=1 Q it . Define P t (Q t ) to be the inverse residual demand function that represents market-level demand, net of imports from neighboring provinces and supply from a price-taking fringe of competitors.
In the second-stage, taking P f and q f it as given, each firm i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 chooses q it to maximize:
where λ it and µ it is the Lagrangian multiplier on the upper and lower bound constraints, respectively.
Define ⊥ to represent complementarity. Using (18), each firm i's optimal output choice satisfies the following complementarity conditions: 2, 3, 4, 5. (20) In the first-stage, each firm i aims to maximize its profit by choosing its forward market sales q f it , taking into account its impact on the subsequent spot market equilibrium. Under the assumption of no arbitrage (Allaz and Vila, 1993) , the forward price equals the spot market price. Each firm i's first-stage forward contracting problem can be represented as a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) that treats the spot market optimality conditions (19) and (20) 
it ; spot market constraints (19) and (20); (21) where Ω f it represents the region of feasible forward contracts. 19 Since each firm's forward contracting problem is represented by the MPEC in (21), the overall multifirm problem is an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC). A solution to this EPEC amounts to solving simulatenously a set of interconnected MPECs. This yields a solution to all variables in the two-stage forward-spot model. At this solution, we achieve a Nash equilibrium as no market participant wishes to unilaterally adjust its strategic variable in either market (Hu and Ralph, 2007) .
We use the solution methodology established by Xian et al. (2004) to solve this EPEC by reformulating the problem as a mixed nonlinear complementarity program. 20 To implement this large-scale EPEC, we use the semi-smooth Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm on the KNITRO solver using the GAMS software. 21 We solve the EPEC for the pre-merger (N = 5) setting and all possible two firm mergers in Alberta.
Marginal Cost
We estimate the marginal cost of fossil-fuel based thermal generation units using hourly coal (C) and natural gas (N G) price data (p C t , p N G t ), unit-specific thermal efficiencies measured by an asset j's heatrate (HR j i ), variable operating and maintenance (O&M) costs, and environmental compliance costs. 22 An asset i's constant marginal cost equals the summation of its fuel costs (p l t × HR j i for l ∈ {N G, C}), variable O&M costs, and the marginal environmental compliance costs up to its maximum capacity.
To account for generation unit outages, we adjust the maximum name-plate capacity cap j i of each fossil-fired unit i owned by firm j by the probability of a forced outages, derated to account for partial unit availability (df of j i ). 23 The available capacity of unit j equals q j,M ax it
If over an entire month a unit was unavailable, we suppose that the outage was planned and anticipated, and set its capacity to zero for that month. A firm i's maximum flexible thermal generation capacity (q M ax it ) equals the summation of derated generation capacity across all of its thermal assets.
Coal generation units in our sample have a minimum stable generation (MSG) level below which they cannot maintain reliable combustion conditions. Recent estimates of MSG as a percentage of nameplate capacity for Alberta coal units have ranged from 30% to 50% (MSA, 2010b; Kendall-Smith, 2013) . Examining the amount of capacity dispatched and the number of MWs offered at $0 by coal units in our data suggests similar numbers. 24 In our data, the 1st and 5th percentiles of MWs dispatched as a percentage of nameplate capacity and averaged across coal units are 42% and 55%, respectively. Looking at MWs offered at $0, these averages become 40% and 46%. In our analysis, as a conservative approximation we assume that 35% of a coal unit's nameplate capacity is MSG. Increasing this figure is likely to reduce predicted prices. Our assumption of 35% is broadly consistent with the literature for other jurisdictions. 25
In addition to flexible fossil-fired generation units, a sizable portion of electricity generation in Alberta comes from cogeneration and wind turbines. Cogeneration facilities generate heat and electricity as a byproduct of an on-site industrial process. Electricity that is not consumed on-site is sold to the wholesale market. We assume that output from wind and cogeneration facilities are must-run and have marginal cost equal to zero. These assets systematically submit offers equal to zero into the wholesale market. In addition, there are several small hydro units in Alberta. Because hydro units can store their generation potential, marginal costs represent the opportunity cost of using the energy at some other time. Similar to Borenstein et al. (2002) and Brown and Olmstead (2016) , we assume that the output generated by hydro units is identical to the amount that would be produced by a price-taking firm. 26 Using the established unit-level marginal cost for flexible thermal generation, we approximate the firms' stepwise marginal cost functions as follows. For each unit and month, we average marginal cost across all hours. Then, using the unit-level derated capacities discussed above, we order a firm's units in order of least cost. For computational reasons, we then approximate each firms' aggregate marginal cost 22 See Appendix B for additional details on the data sources used to estimate unit-level marginal costs. 23 A similar approach was undertaken by Bushnell et al. (2008) . Borenstein et al. (2002) use a Monte-Carlo approach to simulate the random process associated with unit availability. This approach is numerically intractable in our analysis. 24 Under Alberta's ISO rules, units are required to offer MSG each hour at the lowest price offered by the unit, which is effectively always $0. Therefore, the number of MW offered at $0 acts as a useful upper bound on MSG. 25 For example, Neuhoff et al. (2013) assume that MSG equals 38% of capacity in an analysis of Europe. 26 We apply the observed output from hydro generation for each hour and analyze the amount of non-hydro production necessary to meet demand net of hydro generation. The biases associated with this approach are limited in the Alberta context because hydro represents approximately 2% of annual production.
function using a monotonically increasing fourth-order polynomial. 
Residual Demand
We estimate the residual demand for electricity faced by the five large incumbent suppliers (Q RD t (p t )) as the price inelastic short-run market demand (Q t ), net of price-responsive supply from imports from neighboring provinces Saskatchewan (SK) and British Columbia (BC) and supply from a competitive fringe of producers within Alberta.
Firms in neighboring provinces are required to submit their offers to supply power into Alberta two hours in advance of the hourly spot market. While this limits importers' ability to react in real-time, these firms form expectations regarding the anticipated Alberta wholesale power price. For each hour t and neighboring province j, we estimate the following price-responsive import supply function: 28
27 Using the established marginal cost functions, we choose the fourth-order polynomial parameters to minimize the squared differences between the estimated marginal cost and the observed marginal cost, subject to a restriction that this function is non-decreasing. We solve this nonlinear program using the primal-dual interior point optimization method (IPOPT respectively. Because supply from the fringe is dominated by natural gas units, the calendar fixed-effects and natural gas prices control for cost-related shocks. 31 In addition to price-responsive supply, fringe producers have zero-marginal cost wind and cogeneration output. We take this must-run supply as given in each hour and subtract it directly from aggregate market demand.
In both of the import supply functions and the estimation of fringe supply, the wholesale market price p t is endogenous to the degree of net imports and supply from the competitive fringe. Similar to Bushnell (2007) and Bushnell et al. (2008) , we employ an instrumental variables (IV) approach using the hourly day-ahead market demand forecast as the excluded instrument in each of the regressions detailed above. Ignoring the endogeneity of price would lead to attenuation bias, reducing the estimated priceresponsiveness of imports and fringe supply. Day-ahead forecasted demand is a valid instrument because wholesale demand is effectively perfectly price inelastic. 32 Most consumers in Alberta face largely fixed retail rates that vary at most monthly, shielding them from hourly price fluctuations. Further, forecasted demand only impacts imports and supply from the fringe through its impact on the market price. 33 Tables 3 and 4 provide the detailed Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and first and second-stage IV estimation results for the import and fringe supply function estimations. In each regression, ignoring the endogeneity of price results in the anticipated attenuation bias, biasing down the price coefficient.
For each IV estimation, the Kleibergen-Paap (K-P) Wald F-Stat strongly rejects the null hypothesis that our excluded instrument is weak. In each IV estimation, increases in day-ahead forecasted demand result in a statistically significant increase in the first-stage price. As demonstrated in F) ). The cities considered in BC and SK are Vancouver and Saskatoon, respectively. The results of the analysis are robust to the consideration of higher degree polynomials on the temperature variables and alternative large cities in each province. 30 Alternatively, one could treat the offers of the fringe as its marginal cost curve and the fringe's competitive supply curve.
This would yield a fringe supply curve that is a discontinuous step-function, and would require incorporating the fringe's capacity constraint. Both of these yield computational difficulties that are beyond the scope of this paper. 31 Natural gas prices reflect the hourly natural gas price from Alberta's Natural Gas Exchange (NGX). Because regional gas prices may be endogenous to local supply and demand conditions, we also used monthly natural gas prices from Henry Hub (converted to Canadian Dollars using Bank of Canada exchange rates). The Henry Hub and NGX natural gas prices are strongly correlated (ρ = 0.94). The residual demand estimation results are unaffected by the use of Henry Hub prices. 32 Price responsive load that is subject to wholesale price represents less than 2% of average market demand. 33 For each model, we estimate the model using an IV approach with Newey-West heteroskedasatic and autocorrelation robust standard errors with 24 lags. provinces, although this effect is statistically insignificant in the first-stage for SK. Table 4 demonstrates a statistically significant negative effect of natural gas prices on fringe supply. In each regression, price has a positive and statistically significant impact on the quantity of imports and supply from the competitive fringe. The estimated average price-elasticity of imports is 0.12 and 0.48 for SK and BC, respectively.
The estimated fringe supply function yields an average price-elasticity of fringe supply equal to 0.20.
Having established estimates for the price-responsive fringe and import supply, we formulate an hourly residual demand function facing the five large suppliers in Alberta. The average price-elasticity of the estimated residual demand function equals −0.054. This corresponds to the degree of average residual demand price-elasticity found in other regions such as PJM and New England (Bushnell et al., 2008) . In Section 4.5.3, we investigate the robustness of our results to our estimated residual demand function.
Results
In this section, we discuss the key findings of our empirical analysis. We illustrate the quality-of-fit of the forward-spot Cournot model to observed market outcomes. Then, we use these results to simulate various mergers, illustrating the importance of forward commitments.
Comparison of Actual and Estimated Market Outcomes
Unlike standard merger simulations, we do not calibrate the model to fit observed market outcomes.
Therefore, before proceeding to simulating the effects of various mergers, we review the output from the forward-spot Cournot Nash equilibrium for the existing market structure. Table 5 presents the observed and estimated firm-specific wholesale market quantities and market-clearing prices for the year 2013. As illustrated in Table 5 , the model equilibrium predicts aggregate production from the five large producers (q Aggregate ) closely (within 1%). With the exception of ATCO, average estimated firm-level outputs are within 10% of observed outputs. Table 5 also demonstrates that our model overestimates average market price, and that simulated prices exhibit less variability than actual prices. We believe that the higher estimated average price is arising for three primary reasons. First, we focus on the strategic incentive for forward contracting established by Allaz and Vila (1993) . Green (1999) and van Eijkel et al. (2016) demonstrate that firms have both strategic and risk-hedging incentives to forward contract.
While a consideration of the risk-hedging incentives is beyond the scope of the current analysis, Section 5 stresses the importance of future research that considers both forward contracting incentives. Second, similar to other studies that solve large-scale EPECs (e.g., Yao et al. (2008) ), we are limited to using a linear residual demand function due to computational constraints. Bushnell et al. (2008) demonstrate that nonlinear demand representations can increase the estimated price-elasticity of residual demand.
Section 4.5.3 considers various comparative statics on the residual demand function to ensure that the key results of our analysis are robust to our specification of residual demand. A third possible explanation for simulated prices exceeding actual prices is that our assumed MSG for coal units of 35% is likely a conservative underestimate, as discussed above.
Support for the last two explanations is provided by looking at the model fit over different ranges of market demand (which is considered in our model to be exogenous and perfectly inelastic). In particular, our model matches average prices very closely for hours with average to high demand. Over hours with demand within the 40th to 90th percentiles, the difference between the average predicted and observed prices falls to $2.30. This suggests that our model is a good fit for mid-to-peak demand hours, and is best suited for predicting the effects of mergers in these hours. In general, our model overpredicts prices in off-peak hours, and underpredicts in hours with demand in the top 10%. Over-prediction of prices in low demand hours can result from our conservative assumptions regarding MSG, while underpredicting price in the highest demand hours can result from our linear fringe supply, which does not reflect fringe capacity constraints. Addressing these issues is the subject of future research.
It should be noted that because we use expected derate-adjusted capacities in our model, our model is not expected to predict hour to hour variation in prices, that will be largely driven by unanticipated unit shutdowns or capacity reductions. As a result, our model exhibits a lower variance of prices than is observed in actual prices. Our model is therefore better suited to understanding the average effect of mergers than predicting hourly volatility.
Finally, of key importance to our analysis is the estimated equilibrium forward positions. Our model yields average estimated forward positions (as a percentage of spot market quantity) of 68%, 70%, 72%, 70% and 79% for ATCO, CP, ENMAX, TA, and TC, respectively. The aggregate average forward contract coverage across all firms is 76%. The estimated forward contract coverage is consistent with the amount often observed in practice. For example, Wolfram (1999) , Wolak (2007) , and Sweeting (2007) observe forward contract coverage as a percentage of output from 73% to 103%. 34
While data on spot market conduct is publicly available, public information on forward markets in Alberta is limited. 35 Hortacsu and Puller (2008) propose approximating firm-specific forward positions as the quantity at which the firm's offer curve intersects its marginal cost function from below. Applying this approximation to Alberta, we find that the implied average forward contract coverage ranges from 82% to 96%. Our estimated forward positions are lower than the levels implied using Hortacsu and Puller's approach. One possible explanation may be that our model incorporates only strategic incentives for forward contracting. Alternatively, Hortacsu and Puller's approach does not account for non-convexities in firm's marginal cost functions such as MSG constraints that induce firms to offer capacity at a price 34 MSA (2010) provides evidence that forward trading in Alberta is lower than other electricity markets worldwide. 35 While precise data on the forward commitments of individual firms are not publicly available, we expect that firm's are able to draw inferences about rivals' positions. Such inferences may be drawn from participation in procurement processes (such as auctions) for fixed price contracts for retail supply, or by monitoring the Natural Gas exchange, through which much of the forward contracting occurs. Finally, ENMAX is vertically integrated and supplies retail customers both through regulated and competitive retail plans. Data on its supply through the regulated default product are publicly available.
of zero to ensure it is fully dispatched. 36
Merger Simulation
We simulate the effects of all possible two-firm mergers involving the five large firms in Alberta. A merger represents a transfer of a firm's must-run generation and flexible (dispatchable) generation capacity to another firm. Then, for each hour, we reformulate the post-merger problem as an EPEC and solve the model for the Nash equilibrium using nonlinear programming methods detailed in Section 4.2. 37
To understand the impact of endogenous forward contracting on wholesale market outcomes in the presence of a merger, we undertake two additional simulations that fix the level of forward contracted quantities. First, we simulate the post-merger market outcomes holding each firms' forward quantities (in MWs) constant. This environment reflects a setting where forward commitments are exogenous. For example, the merging firms have exogenous forward retail commitments or long-term supply contracts (Bushnell et al., 2008) . Second, we simulate the post-merger market outcomes holding each firms' percentage of output forward contracted constant. This setting can reflect an environment where firms are required to forward contract a fixed percentage of their wholesale output. 38 Notes: ∆% represents the percentage change in prices from the pre-merger equilibrium. Table 6 illustrates the level and percentage changes in average wholesale market price for each of the ten possible two firm mergers. 39 When forward contracts are endogenous the simulated price effects of the mergers are potentially dramatic. The simulated mergers lead to price increases of 25% to 104% depending on the merger and assumptions regarding forward position. 40 These large price effects are arising in part because the residual demand faced by the largest five firms is highly price inelastic. 41
36 Using Hortacsu and Puller's approach, the highest estimated implied forward contract coverage arises from TA and TC, the firms whose generation portfolios primarily consists of base-load coal generators with a large amount of MSG. 37 Brown and Eckert (2016b) detail the mixed nonlinear complementarity program used to solve the post-merger EPEC. 38 Regulators have imposed or advocated for the imposition of requirements on firms' forward contracting quantities to alleviate concerns over market power (Harvey and Hogan, 2000; Frutos and Fabra, 2012) . 39 The results are presented as unweighted averages. Weighting hours by market demand has little impact on estimated price effects, estimated weighted and unweighted average prices differ by less than $2/MWh for all mergers. 40 In the recent Exelon and Constellation merger analysis, numerical simulations of wholesale market competition found that under certain circumstances wholesale prices could rise over 25% due to the merger (MPSC, 2012, pg. 46) . 41 Section 4.5.3 demonstrates that the key qualitative conclusions of our analysis are robust to a more price-elastic residual Using the firm characteristics in Table 1 , we can see that the largest price effects tend to arise when the firms with the most flexible generation capacity (least must-run and MSG) merge. For example, mergers with endogenous forward contracting that involve ENMAX and CP yield the highest price effects, while those that involve TA and TC tend to yield the least. This demonstrates an important asymmetry across firms in the effects of mergers with endogenous forward contracting.
The price effects of the mergers in Table 6 are substantially larger when the forward positions are endogenous. As shown in Proposition 2, the price effects of mergers are magnified when forward contracts are endogenous because firms have an incentive to reduce their forward contract coverage. This commits the firms' to a lower level of output in the Cournot wholesale market, holding all else constant. We find that the percentage increase in prices from the merger is often over two times larger with endogenous forward positions than when forward committed MWs are held constant. The setting where firms are required to hold forward contracts as a percentage of output constant is the intermediate case in terms of price effects. This arises because the higher concentration reduces firms' output levels in the Cournot framework and so, the forward contracted quantities decrease even though the percentage of forward contracts are held constant. Table 7 illustrates that the merged and non-merging firms' forward contract coverage decrease for all merger cases in the post-merger equilibrium. As shown in Proposition 1, in the post-merger equilibrium, all firms reduce their forward contract coverage because of the reduced strategic incentive to forward contract. The reduced forward contracting magnifies the price effects of the mergers. We can also use the model to assess the change in profits of the merging firms that arise from the merger. While the mergers may also impact firms' fixed costs, we focus our analysis only on changes in variable profits and costs. Table 8 illustrates the change in the combined profits of the merged firms in the post-merger equilibrium. The largest increase in the merging firm's profits occur in the setting with endogenous forward contracts. The increase in payments from the higher wholesale prices dominates the lower payments associated with the merged firm's reduced output. Alternatively, it is often the case that the increase in the merging firm's profits when forward contracts are held constant in MWs exceeds those when forward contracts are held constant as a percentage of output. This arises because the merging demand function.
firm's output decreases and so, when forward contracts are held constant as a percentage of output, the forward quantities decrease. Holding forward contracts constant in MWs commits the merging firm to a higher level of output in the wholesale market compared to the setting where forward contracts are held constant as a percentage of output. While this reduces the equilibrium spot price, the higher output results in an overall higher level of profit for the merged firm. Proposition 3 demonstrates that there can be cases where the merged firm's profits are higher when forward contracted quantities are held constant at pre-merger levels in MWs. In the current merger simulation, the large price increases in the endogenous forward contracting setting dominate the reduction in profits and so, this case never arises. 42 In light of the large price effects in Table 6 , it is illustrative to consider how these transactions might have been handled using traditional antitrust screens based on concentration measures. Our discussion is at most suggestive, as we do not engage in a detailed market definition exercise. 43 Taking the market to be wholesale electricity from generators located in Alberta (including nondispatchable generation such as wind), and using generation capacity to compute market shares, we can compute for each merger the combined market shares of the merging parties, along with the pre-and post-merger Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) statistics. Table 9 presents these concentration measures for each merger. Using the US Horizontal Merger Guidelines (United States Department of Justice, 2010), only three of the merger simulations would be considered even moderately concentrated with an HHI exceeding 1500, although the increases in HHI would all exceed the 100 or 200 point thresholds identified in those guidelines.
The combined market share of the merging firms in all cases fall below the 35% safe harbour threshold given in the Canadian Merger Enforcement Guidelines (Competition Bureau, 2011) , suggesting that the Commissioner would be unlikely to challenge the merger. 44 The combined market share of the merging firms all fail the FERC's wholesale market share threshold of 20% (FERC, 2012) . Of course, these concentration measures will be sensitive to the precise market definition and construction of market shares.
However, the results highlight the well known observation that traditional concentration measures can be poorly suited for identifying market power in electricity markets.
42 Section 4.5.3 considers a more price-elastic residual demand and demonstrates that the merged firm's profits can be higher when forward contracted output is held at pre-merger levels in MWs than those with endogenous forward contracts. 43 See MSA (2012) for an extended discussion of geographic market definition issues in Alberta's wholesale electricity market, and issues arising regarding concentration statistics and market shares. 44 The majority of the mergers do not violate the provisions in Alberta's Fair, Efficient and Open Competition Regulation Notes: Change in HHI represents the change in the HHI due to the merger.
Sensitivity Analysis
As discussed above, computational constraints require us to model residual demand linearly, which has been shown in other studies of electricity markets to underestimate price-elasticity (e.g., Bushnell et al. (2008) ). In this section we increase the price-responsiveness of our residual demand function to demonstrate that our key findings are robust to increased price sensitivity of residual demand. In particular,
we increase the average price-elasticity of residual demand by 50% and 100% by exogenously increasing the residual demand slope coefficient estimated in the baseline analysis. Then, we resolve the large-scale EPEC for the pre-and post-merger equilibria for all possible two-firm mergers. We will focus on the 50% increase case; the 100% increase case generates similar findings and is presented in Appendix C. Table 10 presents the observed and estimated firm-specific wholesale market quantities and marketclearing prices with a 50% increase in the average price-elasticity of residual demand. The equilibrium average market price closely reflects the observed average market prices. The model equilibrium predicts aggregate production from the five large producers (q Aggregate ) closely (within 2.2%). With the exception of ATCO and TransCanada, average estimated firm-level outputs are within 10% of observed outputs. Notes: All quantity values are in MW and price is in $/MWh. Table 11 presents the merger effects with a 50% increase in the average price-elasticity of residual (Alta Reg 159/2009 ) that prevents a firm from holding offer control greater than 30% of Alberta Maximum Capability.
demand. The higher price-elasticity of residual demand dampens the price effects, but the key conclusions remain. The merger price effects are magnified in the setting with endogenous forward contracting. For each merger, both the merging and non-merging firms' forward contract coverage decrease due to the reduced incentive for strategic forward contracting. In the setting with endogenous forward contracts, the market price increases by 17.97% to 76.81%. This is often over two times larger than the price increases that would have occurred if firms' forward contracted quantities in MWs were held at pre-merger levels.
Similar to the baseline model, the largest price effects tend to arise when the firms with the most flexible generation capacity merge (e.g., ENMAX and CP). Further, the setting where firms' forward contracts are held constant as a percentage of output is the intermediate case in terms of the price increases. Notes: ∆% represents the percentage change in prices from the pre-merger equilibrium. Table 12 illustrates the percentage change in the merging firm's profits in the post-merger equilibrium when the average price-elasticity of residual demand is increased 50%. While all mergers increase the merging firm's profits assuming endogenous forward contracting, this is not the case when forward contract percentages are fixed. On the other hand, for several cases the estimated increase in profit for the merging firms is greatest under the assumption that the firms' forward contracted quantities are held fixed in MWs at pre-merger levels. Hence, the effect of endogenous forward contracting on the incentive to merge is ambiguous. Committing the merged firm to forward sales equal to the sum of the firms' forward MWs pre-merger results in a higher market share of the total wholesale market output for the merging firm than under endogenous contracting. This credible forward commitment can result in higher profits compared to the endogenous forward contracting environment, as was demonstrated in Proposition 3 for the symmetric model. Therefore, while endogenous forward contracting yields the largest price effect from the merger, there can be a strategic benefit of holding forward contracted quantities fixed at pre-merger levels (in MWs) for the merging firms. This effectively commits them to a larger market output, forcing rivals to smaller outputs. This effect persists in the 100% increase in the average price-elasticity case presented in Table A3 . 
Conclusion
We have developed a model of electricity market mergers with endogenous forward contracting. We found that mergers reduce firms' incentives to forward contract in the post-merger environment. This is primarily driven by the lower strategic effect of forward contracting in the post-merger equilibrium.
The reduction in forward contracting elevates the price effects of mergers, magnifying the reduction in consumer surplus compared to an environment where forward contracted quantities are held at pre-merger levels. Whether the profits of the merged firm are higher when the forward contract quantities of all firms can be adjusted post-merger compared to when they are fixed at pre-merger levels is ambiguous, and depends on the number of firms in the market. Our results illustrate that the price effects of mergers are dampened when firms' forward commitments are held constant post-merger due to regulatory restrictions or mandated supply contracts.
Our formal analysis lends considerable support to concerns in recent merger cases that firms may reduce their level of fixed-price forward contracts in the post-merger equilibrium. Using data from Alberta's wholesale electricity market, we demonstrate that a merger simulation can largely underestimate the price effects of proposed mergers if forward commitments are held constant at pre-merger levels. Further our empirical analysis supports the finding that while endogenous forward contracting can elevate wholesale prices, it can potentially erode the merged firm's profits. Holding forward contracts at pre-merger levels (in MWs) can commit the merged firm to a higher level of production in the post-merger wholesale markets, driving their rivals to a lower level of output.
Market screening policies and oligopoly simulation models currently used by antitrust authorities such as the FERC and the Department of Justice can be useful instruments to investigate the competitive impacts of proposed electricity market mergers. However, a more detailed consideration of firms'
forward commitments when analyzing electricity market structure changes such as mergers is necessary.
Abstracting from the endogenous nature of fixed-price forward contracts can lead regulators and antitrust authorities to biased conclusions regarding the competitive impacts of proposed mergers.
In concluding, we discuss several extensions of our analysis that merit further investigation. First, we focused on a setting where firms signed forward contracts solely for strategic reasons. Generation firms may also forward contract for risk-hedging reasons. This can potentially reduce firms' incentives to decrease their level of forward contracting in the post-merger environment. 45 A formal analysis that considers both strategic and risk-hedging forward contracting incentives in the presence of a merger warrants formal investigation. Second, due to computation constraints we focused on a setting with linear residual demand that represented supply from fringe producers and imports from neighboring provinces. A more robust nonlinear characterization of fringe supply and residual demand is left for future research. However, as demonstrated by the residual demand function sensitivity analyses, the key conclusions drawn above are likely to persist in the context of this more robust residual demand function.
Third, similar to Bushnell (2007) , we considered a two-period model where firms undergo a single round of forward contracting prior to wholesale Cournot competition. However, several studies find that repeated interaction and multiple stages of forward contracting may erode the competitive effects of forward contracting by facilitating collusion (e.g., Liski and Montero (2006) ; Green and Le Coq (2006) ).
Such anticompetitive behavior through the use of forward contracts can potentially be enhanced in the post-merger equilibrium. These dynamic incentives should be considered in future research.
Fourth, alternative market structure changes such as partial mergers, generation unit divestitures, and asset acquisitions merits further investigation. 46,47 These types of market structure changes can also impact firms incentives to adjust their level of forward contracts. We anticipate these market structure changes will exhibit similar findings to those illustrated in our current analysis, but the details of the analysis remain to be determined. Fifth, when comparing the pre-and post-merger effects, we considered the settings where either all firms' forward contracts are endogenous or are held constant at pre-merger levels. A formal analysis that considers settings where only a subset of firms endogenously choose their forward contracts post-merger warrants formal investigation. Although, we suspect our key results will remain as the reduced strategic incentives associated with forward contracting is likely to persist in this alternative setting for those firms that adjust their forward position in the post-merger equilibrium.
45 van Eijkel and Moraga-Gonzalez (2016) find that strategic and risk-hedging reasons for forward contracting create opposing predictions regarding the effect of an increase in the number of firms on firms' incentives to sign forward contracts. The authors find that risk-hedging can increase firms' incentives to sign forward contracts as the number of firms decrease. 46 For example, in Alberta, certain generating units are under long-term contracts called Power Purchase Arrangements which give the buyer of the contract offer control over the asset. In 2020, the expiry of these contracts will return offer control of the generating asset to the owner, leading to a sizable change in the market structure (MSA, 2011) . 47 Virtual divestitures of generation assets have been used in European electricity markets to reduce market concentration (Frutos and Fabra, 2012) .
Appendix A Proofs of Formal Conclusions
Proof of Lemma 1: (2) can be rewritten as:
Multiplying both sides of (24) by β i and summing across all firms yields:
( 3) and (4) follows from (25) given P (Q) = a − bQ. (5) follows from (3) and (24).
Using (2), because b and k i are positive constants, each firm's profit function is strictly concave in q i :
Proof of Lemma 2: Using (3) - (5) and that β i > 0 ∀ i = 1, 2, ..., N , the following inequalities hold:
Proof of Lemma 3: Using the marginal effects of forward contracting on spot market quantities identified in Lemma 2, (10) follows from (9).
Using ( 
Proof of Proposition 1: It is without loss of generality to assume that firms 1 and 2 merge resulting in capital stock Using (11) , the difference between firm 1 and the merged firm's proportion of forward contracted output satisfies:
Similar reasoning applies for firm 2. Next, we illustrate that the non-merging firms reduce the proportion of output that is forward contracted. It is without loss of generality to focus on the non-merging firm 3. Denote q f 3 and q 3 to be firm 3's post-merger forward and spot market output, respectively. Using (11) and that β 1 + β 2 − β M > 0:
Proof of Lemma 4: Using (10) and that β i = β for all i = 1, 2, ..., N and B = N β:
(14) follows from (29).
Using (14) and recognizing that B = N β in this symmetric setting, (5) is simplified to:
(12) follows from (30). Recognizing that P (Q) = a − bN q, (13) follows from (12).
Proof of Proposition 2: First, we illustrate that the spot market prices increase post-merger, holding forward contracting quantities at pre-merger levels. Define q f P re to be the symmetric pre-merger forward contracting level. Using (4) and that B = N β N M and B M = β M + (N − 2)β N M , the spot market prices pre-and post-merger, holding forward contracting quantities at pre-merger levels, equals:
Using (31) and that
, and β M = 2bk 2bk+1 :
Using (14), (32) simplifies:
Because spot market prices are decreasing in total output Q, P P ost − P P re > 0 implies that total output decreases post-merger, holding forward contracting quantities at pre-merger levels.
Second, we illustrate that total output post-merger is lower with endogenous forward contracts (Q P ost Endog ) compared to total output holding forward contracting quantities at pre-merger levels (Q P ost F ixed ). Using (3) and
Using (10) and B M = β M + (N − 2)β N M , in the post-merger equilibrium a non-merging firm's forward contract quantity satisfies:
Using (5) 
Using (39), (38) simplifies:
Using (37) and (40), the post-merger forward contract quantities satisfy:
; and
Using (28) and (42), (34) can be rewritten as:
Using (42), that β N M = bk 1+bk and β M = 2bk 1+2bk , and using Mathematica to simplify the algebraic expression, (43) can be rewritten as:
(44) holds for all N ≥ 3. Hence, Q P ost Endog < Q P ost F ixed . This implies that the price increasing impact of
B Marginal Cost Estimation
Data on natural gas unit heat rates were obtained from Alberta's Market Surveillance Administrator (MSA), the Alberta Utility Commission, and the AESO. Coal unit heat rates were obtained from CASA (2004) . Data on technology-specific variable O&M costs were obtained from the Energy Information Administration (EIA, 2016) . Hourly natural gas prices were obtained from Alberta's Natural Gas Exchange.
We use weekly coal prices from Wyoming's Powder River Basin (PRB) from the Energy Information Administration to estimate the marginal cost of coal units in Alberta. 48 PRB coal is sub-bituminuous coal which is the primary coal used for electricity generation in Alberta. Further, PRB coal and Alberta's sub-bituminuous coal have similar heat-rate contents (Alberta Energy, 2014). We adjusted the PRB coal prices and USD based variable O&M costs from USD to CAD using Bank of Canada exchange rates.
The environmental compliance costs are analogous to those detailed in Brown and Olmstead (2016 
C 100% Increase in Price-Elasticity of Residual Demand
Tables A1 -A3 demonstrate that the key qualitative conclusions of our analysis are robust to a 100% increase in the average price-elasticity of residual demand. This adjusts the mixed complementarity conditions specified in (19) and (20) to:
q it ≤ q max it ⊥ λ it ≥ 0, ∀ i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.
A1 Status Quo: No Merger
Consider the setting where there is no merger. First, we reformulate the nonlinear mixed complementarity conditions that characterize the solution to the second-stage spot market defined in (19) and (20). Second, we characterize the solution to each firm's MPEC defined in (21) by representing the problem as a nonlinear program and deriving the corresponding Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions.
We introduce slack variables s 1it and s 2it such that the nonlinear mixed complementarity program (MCP) represented by (48) and (49) becomes:
q it − q max it + s 2it = 0; (51)
In the formulation of each firm's first-stage MPEC defined in (21), conditions (52) and (53) represent complementarity constraints that are difficult to solve using nonlinear optimization algorithms. Following
Facchinei and Kanzow (1997) and Xian et al. (2004) , we use a nonlinear complementarity function that has the following property:
Applying (54) to (52) and (53) allows us to rewrite the spot market MCP in (50) -(53) as:
(s 1it ) 2 + (q it ) 2 − s 1it − q it = 0; (57) (s 2it ) 2 + (λ it ) 2 − s 2it − λ it = 0 ∀ i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.
Having removed the MCP conditions from the second-stage spot market, we reformulate each firm's MPEC defined in (21) as a mixed nonlinear program where they maximize their objective function, choosing all endogenous variables in the two-stage model (for additional details see Xian et al. (2004) and Hu and Ralph (2007) 
We use (60) to characterize the KKT conditions for each player i. The Nash equilibrium of the twostage multi-firm forward-spot market model represented by the EPEC can be obtained by concatenating all of the KKT conditions for each player's MPEC. Using (60), for each period t, the aggregated mixed nonlinear complementarity program is represented by the following conditions: 2, 3, 4, 5; (61) q it : P t (Q t ) q it + q M R it + q M SG it + P t (Q t ) − C it (q it ) + η iit 2 P t (Q t ) + P t (Q t ) q it + q use the semi-smooth Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm on the KNITRO solver using the GAMS software.
To reduce the likelihood that the equilibrium to this constrained nonlinear system is a local optimum, we use the multistart algorithm to solve this EPEC 50 times for all 8,760 hours in our sample. The best optimization problem of each non-merging firm i = 3, 4, 5 is represented as: 
P t (Q t ) + P t (Q t ) q jt + q Subsequently, the Lagrangian function for a player i = 3, 4, 5 in MPEC (82) and the merged firm M in MPEC (83) is:
